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Abstract
Common asset holdings are widely believed to have been the primary vector of
contagion in the recent financial crisis. We develop a network approach to the am-
plification of financial contagion due to the combination of overlapping portfolios and
leverage, and we show how it can be understood in terms of a generalized branching
process. By studying a stylized model we estimate the circumstances under which
systemic instabilities are likely to occur as a function of parameters such as leverage,
market crowding, diversification, and market impact. Although diversification may be
good for individual institutions, it can create dangerous systemic effects, and as a result
financial contagion gets worse with too much diversification. Under our model there
is a critical threshold for leverage; below it financial networks are always stable, and
above it the unstable region grows as leverage increases. The financial system exhibits
“robust yet fragile” behavior, with regions of the parameter space where contagion is
rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs. Our model and methods of analysis can be
calibrated to real data and provide simple yet powerful tools for macroprudential stress
testing.
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1 Introduction
The 2007–2009 financial crisis highlighted the complex interconnections between finan-
cial institutions and made it clear that we need a better understanding of how financial
contagion propagates and the circumstances under which it is amplified [1–9]. Financial
contagion comes through different channels, including (i) counterparty risk, (ii) roll-over
risk, and (iii) common asset holdings, i.e. overlapping portfolios. Of these the first two
have so far received the most attention, even though the primary problem is believed by
many to have been due to the third. Our goal in this paper is to remedy this by gaining
a better understanding of the problem of overlapping portfolios. To do this we develop a
method of computing the stability of financial networks under contagion due to overlap-
ping portfolios. To understand the factors that determine network stability, we develop
and study a stylized model, and suggest how it can be extended to be more realistic. This
model can be regarded as a multiple asset extension of the single asset model developed in
reference [10]1.
Inter-institutional lending drives the problem of counterparty and roll-over risk. Coun-
terparty risk occurs when a bankrupt institution is unable to pay its debts and consequently
causes other institutions to fail [11]. Roll-over risk occurs when financial institutions de-
pend on short term lending for liquidity and their creditors stop lending because they
fail or are under stress, so that they are no longer able to borrow and consequently fail
or become under stress [5]. These have now been extensively studied and we are rapidly
developing better insight into the circumstances where interbank lending causes problems
(see for instance [1, 6, 11]).
Financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios is driven by common asset holdings
[6,12]. In the event that an asset price fluctuation causes an institution to fail, the resulting
“fire sale” of assets by that institution further depresses prices, which in turn may cause
1 Reference [10] considered the properties of leveraged single asset portfolios. It was shown that under
deleveraging market impact can cause bankruptcy if leverage is too large.
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other institutions to fail, causing a spiral of selling and further asset price decreases. This
also induces correlations between different assets that further exacerbate the problem [13].
The problem of overlapping portfolios is very general. It occurs even without inter-
institutional lending, and applies to any institutions that manage money. Although this
can occur even without leverage2, the use of leverage makes it particularly acute. We are
particularly interested in the banking system, where it is not uncommon for investments
to be leveraged by a factor of 30 or more, but our analysis applies equally well to hedge
funds or any other financial institutions that make leveraged investments. For convenience
we will use the word bank to refer to institutions in general, but the reader should bear in
mind that our model applies equally well to any leveraged financial institution.
The problem of overlapping portfolios has previously been considered in references [1,6,
14,15]3. In these papers, however, liquidation effects were considered on top of counterparty
or roll-over risk. Here we are interested in the situation in which shocks can propagate
between different financial institutions through a pattern of local portfolio overlaps (e.g.
bank i has assets in common with bank j, that has other assets in common with bank k,
etc.). The model is simple: we assume that banks own a portfolio of assets, that when a
bank goes bankrupt due to a loss in the value of its portfolio it sells its assets, and that this
in turn causes these assets to be devalued according to a simple market impact function
relating the size of the sale to the change in price.
The model we consider is purely mechanistic, i.e. we do not attempt to describe decision-
making processes by banks. The underlying assumption is that, during the development of
a crisis, banks do not have time to deleverage or rebalance their portfolios before failing.
Thus we consider portfolios fixed until default occurs, and assume that they are fully
liquidated when it occurs. We then perform a macroprudential stress test by applying
localized shocks affecting either a single bank or a single asset. After the initial shock is
applied we test to see whether it causes any bank failures; if so we iterate the process as
needed until either there are no more failures or all banks have failed. The only trades
during the course of the dynamics are fire sales of the assets of insolvent banks.
Our focus in this paper is therefore in understanding the specific role of market impact
and portfolio overlaps as a contagion mechanism between leveraged financial institutions.
To this end, we consider a network of banks and assets, and we test how the average level
of diversification in bank portfolios, the ratio of the number of banks to the number of
assets (crowding), and the leverage attained by banks impact the stability of the system
with respect to an initial shock affecting a single asset or bank.
The stability of the system will be measured in terms of the probability of observing a
2 In this paper we assume that institutions sell assets only when they become bankrupt, in which case
the problem of financial contagion occurs only when leverage is used. In general asset sales may be triggered
by losses that are less severe, for example if investment funds are forced to liquidate even when they are
solvent, as occurred during the stat-arb meltdown in 2007.
3After completing these results we received reference [16], whose independent results are complementary
to ours.
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global cascade of failures, with a smaller probability being associated with a higher stability.
A global cascade of failures, in this context, refers to the failure of a significant fraction of
the banks: that is, a non-zero fraction in the limit of infinite network size. By mapping our
model onto a generalized branching process, we show analytically that there is a region in
parameter space where global cascades of failures occur. One advantage of this mechanistic
approach is that it can in principle be calibrated against real data and used to perform
stress tests on real financial systems.
We find that, as the diversification of the banks’ portfolios increases, the system under-
goes two phase transitions, with a region in between where global cascades occur. Below
the first transition, banks are not interconnected enough for shocks to propagate in the
network. Above the second transition, banks are robust to devaluations in a few of their
assets. In between these two transitions, banks are both vulnerable to shocks in their
asset prices, and interconnected enough for these shocks to spread. We also find that more
leverage increases the overall instability of the network and that the system exhibits a
“robust yet fragile” behavior, with regions of parameter space where contagion is rare but
the whole system is brought down whenever it occurs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. In
Section 3 we map the model into a generalized branching process and present the analytical
approach that allows us to identify the region of phase space where global cascades occur.
In Section 4 we report results from numerical simulations exploring how stability of banking
systems depends on parameters and network properties. In section 5 we compare the results
of numerical simulations to those of stability analysis, and we present our conclusions in
the last section.
2 The model
2.1 Banks, assets, and cascades of bankruptcies
We consider a representation of a financial system given in terms of a network of N banks
and M assets. Whenever a bank invests in an asset, we draw a link in the network
connecting that bank to that asset. The resulting network is bipartite (see Figure 1),
meaning that there are two groups of nodes (banks and assets) and that there are links
only between these two groups. The number of assets in the portfolio of bank i, i.e. the
number of links of the corresponding node, is its degree ki. The average diversification, i.e.
the average degree of banks in the network, is then
µb =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ki , (1)
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the bipartite network of banks and assets. Banks are denoted by
circles, assets by squares. Links connect banks to the assets they have in their portfolios. In this example
N = 4, M = 3, the average banks’ degree is µb = 1.5 and the average assets’ degree is µa = 2.
where the sum runs over all N banks. Conversely, the number of banks that hold asset j
in their portfolio is its degree `j , and the average degree of the assets is
µa =
1
M
M∑
j=1
`j . (2)
Since each link connects a bank to an asset, the total degree of the banks must equal the
total degree of the assets, so
µbN = µaM . (3)
Although a complete description of the network’s topology would require more information,
a rough characterization can be given in terms of two parameters, µb and n = N/M . The
crowding parameter n is a measure of the density of institutions choosing their investments
from the same pool of assets.
Each solvent bank i holds a portfolio {Qi,1, . . . , Qi,M}. Its value at time t is
Ati =
M∑
j=1
Qijp
t
j ,
where Qij is the number of shares of asset j held by bank i and p
t
j the price of asset j
at time t. In our dynamics a bank holds on its portfolio as long as it is solvent, so Qij is
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independent of time. Notice that, given that bank i invests in ki assets, only ki of the M
portfolio weights Qij will be non-zero for bank i.
Each solvent bank also holds cash Ci, and we denote by Li its total liabilities; neither
of these quantities depend on time. If A0i is the initial value of bank i’s portfolio, its initial
equity (or capital) is therefore E0i = A
0
i + Ci − Li. The leverage of a bank is the ratio
between the amount of risky assets on its balance sheet and its equity. Assuming no risk
associated with cash holdings, the initial leverage of bank i is λi = A
0
i /E
0
i .
The condition for bank i to be solvent at time t is
M∑
j=1
Qijp
t
j + Ci ≥ Li . (4)
Given that E0i = A
0
i + Ci − Li, the above condition can be expressed as
A0i −
M∑
j=1
Qijp
t
j ≤ E0i . (5)
The left hand side represents the loss with respect to the initial investment. If such a loss
happens to be greater than the initial capital of the bank, the bank is out of business.
Note that leverage is a necessary condition for banks to fail. A bank investing only its
own capital always satisfies condition (5), since its maximal loss is equal to its equity. We
can write (5) as a condition on the leverage,
λi ≤
∑M
j=1Qijp
t
j
E0i
+ 1 . (6)
Even in the worst case scenario where ptj = 0 for all assets, this condition can be violated
only if λi > 1, i.e. if the bank is leveraged.
Whenever a bank does not satisfy the solvency condition (5), we assume its portfolio
undergoes a fire sale, i.e. all its assets are immediately liquidated. The fire sale causes the
price of the assets in the bank’s portfolio to drop. If xj is the fraction of asset j that has
been liquidated, the price is updated as
pj → pjfj(xj) (7)
We are interested in the response of the system to an initial shock. We consider two
kinds of initial shocks:
• Presence of a toxic asset. We select a random asset j and devalue it at time 0.
• Initial failure of a bank. We select a random bank i and cause it to go bankrupt.
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In each case we follow the chain of events caused by the initial shock. The dynamics
we consider is very simple: after shocking the system at time t = 0, at each time step
t = 1, 2, . . . the solvency condition (5) is checked for each bank, the portfolios of newly
insolvent (bankrupted) banks are liquidated, and new prices are computed for each asset.
The dynamics stops when no new bankruptcies occur between two consecutive time steps.
This can be expressed with the following algorithm:
1. introduce the initial shock in the system;
2. liquidate the portfolio of insolvent banks;
3. recompute prices of assets;
4. if new banks are insolvent go to step 2, otherwise end.
Note that we don’t allow for new banks to enter the system, so that once a bank has gone
bankrupt it remains in this state for the rest of the process.
In the limit of large systems, when N,M →∞ while the parameters µb and n = N/M
remain finite, the initial shock we consider only affects an infinitesimal (of order O(1/N))
fraction of the banking system. We are interested in understanding if and when such
infinitesimal shocks can trigger global cascades of failures. A global cascade of failures
is defined as a cascade affecting a finite fraction of banks in the infinite system. In the
following we will measure the probability and the average extent of contagion. We define
the probability of contagion as the probability that a global cascade of failures occurs, and
the average extent of contagion as the average size of a global cascade.
3 Stability analysis
In this section we develop a theoretical approach that allows us to compute a bound on
stability, which as we will show is a good estimate, for when cascading bank failures are
likely to occur. We show how this can be applied to understand the stability of specific
banking networks (i.e. a given set of banks and their balance sheets), and we also show
how it can be used to understand how stability depends on the parameters of the network,
such as diversification, crowding, and leverage.
Let us start by discussing what happens if there is an external shock that causes a
particular bank to go bankrupt. Through the combination of leverage and impact, this
failure can trigger the failure of other banks investing in the same assets. If the parameters
of the system amplify shocks, this can generate a cascading failure that propagates through
the system. One of our main points is that, while the likelihood of the first bank failure
depends on the nature of the shocks, whether or not this propagates depends on whether
the financial system is stable, which in turn depends on parameters such as the leverage,
market impact and network structure. We begin with a general discussion of branching
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processes. We then discuss how it can be applied to understand a given banking network,
and make some specific assumptions that allow us to demonstrate how the stability of the
banking system depends on parameters.
3.1 The Galton-Watson process
The scenario of cascading failures for banks closely resembles the branching process in-
troduced by Galton and Watson to study the survival probability of family names over
generations [17]. This process is formulated in terms of a progenitor that gives rise to
x children, where x is a non-negative integer drawn from a probability distribution g(x).
Each of the children, in turn, independently generates a number of offspring distributed
according to g(x), and the same process is repeated at each generation. The question is
whether such a process is doomed to extinction or not, i.e. if the population drops to zero
after a finite number of generations, so that the total number of descendants is finite. A
fundamental result in the theory of branching processes states that such a process goes
extinct with probability one if E[x] < 1, where E[x] is the expected number of offspring
per individual.
For our purposes it is essential to consider a generalized Galton-Watson process with
individuals of different types i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , q. The key quantities are then, for each pair of
types i, j, the expected number of offspring of type i produced by an individual of type
j. We denote these as a q × q matrix Nij . The condition for extinction is then that the
largest eigenvalue ξ1 of N is smaller than one [18]. Conversely, if this eigenvalue is greater
than one, then with positive probability this process lasts forever, producing an infinite
number of offspring. We say that the branching process is subcritical or supercritical if this
eigenvalue is less than or greater than one, respectively.
In the context of our model, we are interested in computing the expected number of
banks that go bankrupt because of the previous failure of another bank. Consider for
example the case in which a random bank i receives a shock at time t = 0 that causes it to
become bankrupt. This bank is equivalent to the progenitor of the Galton-Watson process,
and banks whose bankruptcy is triggered by that of i are equivalent to its offspring. In the
language of branching processes, banks failing at time t correspond to individuals in the
t-th generation. We are interested in understanding when there is a non-zero chance that
financial contagion keeps on spreading over time, which is equivalent to asking whether
shocks will be amplified rather than dying out. If the branching process is supercritical,
then this initial shock results in a global cascade with non-zero probability, affecting a
non-zero fraction of all the banks in the limit of infinite system size.
Note that in our model we have in principle banks with different properties (degree,
leverage, size. . . ) that can be considered as individuals of different types in the generalized
Galton-Watson process. Thus Nhk is the expected number of banks of type h that fail
because of the failure of a bank of type k. There is obviously considerable flexibility in how
we classify banks into types, which at its most fine-grained extreme allows the “types” to
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correspond to individual banks.
It is important to stress at this point that the process here considered is more complex
than the usual generalized Galton-Watson process. In particular, in our case, the ultimate
fate of bank i depends not only on its properties, but also on those of all the other banks
whose portfolio overlaps with i. This happens because the price drop that follows the
fire sale liquidation of an asset depends on the fraction of total shares of that asset being
liquidated, which changes from bank to bank.
A second important difference is that the Galton-Watson process occurs on a tree, so
that individuals of a given generation are independent. For banks the failure process is not
necessarily a tree, but is rather a more general graph which may have loops. To see this,
consider a simple example of three banks i, j, and k with one asset in common. Let us
suppose that i is robust with respect to the failure of j by itself, but not with respect to
the failure of both j and k together. Now, if the failure of j is enough to trigger that of k,
then i is effectively vulnerable to the failure of j. Such situations, which occur whenever
assets have degree higher than 2, are neglected under the analytical calculation that we
perform here. Therefore, our analytical treatment gives a sufficient but not a necessary
condition for global cascades to occur, and gives only an upper bound on the stability of
the banking system. We will see, however, that it is nonetheless a good approximation, in
rough agreement with the results of numerical simulations.
It is in principle possible to improve this approximation to account for the non-linearities
induced by loops in the branching process by considering multiple time-step dynamics. This
method is commonly used in dynamical system theory: the t-th iteration of the dynamics
converts cycles of length t into fixed points. For instance, to properly treat triplets one
can compute a two-step matrix that counts the average number of banks of type i whose
failure is triggered by the bankruptcy of a bank of type j within two time steps of the
dynamics. Comparing to the example given above, if an initial shock causes j to fail, k will
fail after one iteration, and since both j and k have now failed, i will fail in the second time
step. While our one-step approximation is already quite accurate, this approach provides
a path for systematically improving the degree of approximation, which deserves further
investigation.
3.2 Stability of a given system
If we have complete information about the banking system, i.e. if we know the portfolios
Qba of all the banks and, in addition, the market impact function for their assets, then we
can describe the stability of the system through a matrix B, where Bij is the probability
that bank i will fail under the failure of bank j. Bank i becomes insolvent when bank j fails
if and only if the market impact due to the sale of their overlapping assets causes a loss to
bank i that exceeds its equity Ei. As described above, we focus for now on the direct effect
on bank i of the failure of bank j. Since we assume that bank j’s entire portfolio {Qja} is
liquidated, the new price for asset a is pa(1 − fa(Qja)). Using the shorthand Prob(x) to
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indicate the probability that condition x is satisfied, the stability matrix Bij is defined as
Bij = Prob
[
M∑
a=1
Qiapa (1− fa (Qja))− Ei > 0
]
. (8)
In order to understand whether a cascade of failures will spread, we compute Bij in the
case where the assets shared by banks i and j have not yet been devalued, and still have
their initial prices. That is, we focus on the “boundary” of the cascade, with failures
and devaluations spreading outward through the network through banks and assets that
have not yet been touched by the crisis. In that case, since the dynamics themselves are
deterministic, Bij depends only on the initial structure of the banks’ portfolios, and in
particular on the network structure. The stability of the banking system can then be
estimated by simply computing the largest eigenvalue ξ1 of B and determining whether ξ1
is greater than or less than one.
Note that, rather than using the simplifying approximation that the market impact
function is deterministic, one could more realistically use a stochastic market impact func-
tion as in [10]. Similarly, imperfect knowledge about bank portfolios and equity can be
coped with using probabilities to represent uncertainties in their values. In either case, we
can still bound the stability of the network by computing B’s largest eigenvalue.
3.3 Simplifying assumptions
The approach described above makes it possible to estimate the stability of the banking
system when it is in a particular state, corresponding to a particular configuration of the
balance sheets of each bank. One of our main goals here, however, is to understand more
generically how the stability of the banking system depends on its network properties.
To make a high-level characterization it is necessary to think in terms of ensembles of
networks, and to understand how stability varies as properties of the ensemble are varied.
As a first step in this direction we will make some specific assumptions in order to simplify
the problem and gain intuition. While these assumptions are rather arbitrary, the basic
method used here is easily generalized, as discussed later.
• Network topology: We will consider random networks with Poisson degree distri-
butions for both banks and assets. Specifically, for each possible bank-asset pair a link
is drawn with probability µb/M . The resulting network is drawn from the bipartite
Erdo˝s-Renyi ensemble of random networks with average degrees µb and µa = µbN/M
for the banks and assets respectively.
• Structure of balance sheets: We will assume all banks have the same amount
of money A0i = A
0 available for investment, and that each bank uniformly splits its
investment in the assets that are in its portfolio. The asset side of bank’s balance
sheets will be composed of 80% assets and 20% cash. For bank i each link thus
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corresponds to an investment of 0.8A0/ki, where ki is the number of assets in i’s
portfolio. Unless otherwise stated, we assume for each bank an initial equity E0i = E
0
corresponding to 4% of its total assets. This corresponds to all banks having initial
leverage λ = A0/E0 = 20.
• Market impact function: We will assume that the market impact function has
the form fj(x
t
j) = e
−αxtj , where xtj is the fraction of asset j liquidated up to time t.
The parameter α is chosen such that the price drops by 10% when 10% of the asset
is liquidated, i.e. α = 1.0536. All prices are set to p0j = 1 at time 0. This choice
corresponds to linear market impact for log-prices, as originally used to describe
price dynamics in [19, 20]. It should be noted that recent empirical and theoretical
evidence indicates that market impact for large trades is a concave function of the
number of traded shares, which under normal conditions impact is well approximated
by a square-root function [21]. By normal conditions we mean that execution is slow
enough for the order book to replenish between successive trades. Under extreme
conditions, like those of a fire sale, market impact is expected to become less concave
and even linear or super-linear [22], which motivates our choice of functional form
here.
Altering these assumptions does not change the qualitative behavior of the system. In
particular, our methods generalize easily to degree distributions other than Poisson, e.g.
power laws, and also to multiple types of banks with different sizes, portfolio structures,
and amounts of leverage, or multiple types of assets with different initial prices and market
impact functions.
3.4 Explicit calculation of the stability matrix
In order to understand how stability depends on network properties, we lump banks into
equivalence classes according to their degree, equating their degree with their type in the
generalized Galton-Watson process. We define the following notation:
• Nh is the number of banks of degree h.
• P(h, k|a) is the probability that a given bank of degree h and a given bank of degree
k share a given asset a, i.e., are both connected to a in the network.
• F (h|k, a) is the probability that a bank of degree h fails given that it is connected to
a failed bank of degree k through asset a.
Under the assumption that we are in the limit where M → ∞, N → ∞ while µb and
n = N/M are finite, the network is sparse, and we can easily compute the probability
Bij by summing over each asset one at a time. If i has degree h and j has degree k, the
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probability that the failure of bank j causes bank i to fail can be written
Bij =
∑
a
P(h, k|a)F (h|k, a) . (9)
Summing over all banks of degree h, the expected number of failures of banks of degree h
caused by the failure of a bank of degree k, is
Nhk = Nh
M∑
a=1
P(h, k|a)F (h|k, a) . (10)
This is the matrix defining the branching process, i.e. the expected number of offspring of
type h from an individual of type k.
We can now compute each of the entires of Nhk in turn. Since the degree distribution of
our network ensemble is Poisson, the number of banks of degree h is simply Nh = NPb(h)
where
Pb(h) =
e−µbµhb
h!
(11)
is the probability that a bank has degree h. A given bank of degree h is connected to a
given asset a with degree `a with probability h`a/(µbN), where µbN is the total number
of edges in the network. The probability that a failed bank of degree k is also connected
to the same asset a is h(k− 1)`a(`a− 1)/(µbN)2, where the factor of k− 1 comes from the
fact that one of the k edges of the failed bank is already connected to the asset that caused
its failure. This gives
P(h, k|a) = h`a(k − 1)(`a − 1)
µ2bN
. (12)
We now compute the probability F (h|k, a) that a bank i of degree h fails due to failure
of a bank j of degree k given that they share an asset a. The shift in price when a fraction xa
of an asset is sold is (1−fa(xa)). (Recall that the initial price is set to one for convenience).
Thus the condition for a bank of degree k to fail because bank j sells a fraction xa of asset
a is
A0
k
(1− fa(xa)) > E0. (13)
If ν(a) denotes the set of banks investing in asset a, the fraction of a that is liquidated
when j fails is
xa =
A0/k∑
m∈ν(a)A0/km
=
1/k∑
m∈ν(a) 1/km
=
1/k
1/h+ 1/k +
∑
m∈ν′(a) 1/km
, (14)
where ν ′(a) denotes the set of banks, other than i and j, that invest in a and km the degree
of bank m.
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To compute F (h|k, a) we must add up the probability of failure for each possible con-
figuration of banks that are compatible with the condition of choosing a specific pair of
banks of degrees h and k that are connected through asset a. If a has degree `a, there are
`a − 2 remaining banks. Letting i index these banks, we must average over the possible
configurations {m1, . . . ,m`a−2}. Fortunately the degrees of the banks are independent.
The probability that bank i has degree mi is the ratio of the number of edges for banks
of degree m to the total number of edges. Since Nm = NPb(m), the number of edges for
banks of degree m is mNm, and the total number of edges in the network is µbN . Thus
each bank has degree m with probability mNm/(µbN) = mPb(m)/µb and the probability
of any given configuration of bank degrees is
`a−2∏
i=1
miPb(mi)
µb
. (15)
Combining equations (13 - 15) and summing over all the possible configurations {m1, . . . ,m`a−2}
gives
F (h|k, a) =
∞∑
m1=1
· · ·
∞∑
m(`a−2)=1
`a−2∏
i=1
miPb(mi)
µb
Θ
[
A0
h
(
1− fa
(
1/k
1/h+ 1/k +
∑`a−2
i=1 1/mi
))
− E0
]
,
(16)
where Θ is the Heaviside step function, Θ(x) = 1 if x > 0 and zero otherwise.
After summing over assets equation (10) becomes
Nhk = e
−µbµhb
h!
h(k − 1)
µ2bn
∑
`
e−µaµ`a
`!
`(`− 1)F (h, k, `), (17)
where we have used the fact that the number of assets with given degree ` is MPa(`) and
explicitly introduced the Poisson degree distributions of banks and assets.
The form of the matrix N confirms that the independent parameters of the model are
µb, n, λ and α. We can see in particular that, although leverage has a similar effect on
stability to the market impact constant α, the two are not related through a simple relation
that allows us to eliminate one of the two dependencies. However, if we had used a market
impact that was linear in the price, instead of the log-price, i.e. of the form fa(x) = α
′x,
then the stability would depend only on the product α′λ and not on the two parameters
separately.
For networks in which all the banks have the same degree k we can compute the largest
eigenvalue of N in closed form. In this case the matrix N reduces to the scalar quantity
N = ξ1 = (k − 1)µbnΓ(l
∗ − 1, µbn)
Γ(l∗ − 1) , (18)
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where
l∗ =
1
log
(
λ
λ−k
) , (19)
Γ(x) is the gamma function, and Γ(x, z) is the incomplete Gamma function.
If we make the approximation 1kb → E
[
1
k
]
we can obtain a closed expression for Nh,k.
However, given that this approximation is uncontrolled, we do not give an explicit form
for the matrix elements, but rather compute them exactly via Montecarlo methods.
4 Dependence on leverage and network properties
We now explore how the stability of the banking network depends on parameters. We first
show results based on numerical simulations and then compare them to results based on
the stability matrix N .
In numerical simulations N and M are both finite, and global cascades can be defined
as cascades for which the fraction of bankrupted banks exceeds a fixed threshold. For
consistency with previous work on counterparty loss [1, 23, 24], we set this threshold to
5%. The contagion probability is then measured as the fraction of runs in which a global
cascade results from the initial shock. The conditional average extent of contagion is the
fraction of failed banks, averaged only over those runs where a global cascade occurs.
4.1 Effect of diversification and crowding
We begin with the case where the initial shock consists of devaluing a random asset., and
examine the dependence on diversification and crowding. In the left panel of Figure 2, we
plot the probability and conditional extent of contagion measured for a system of N = 104
banks and M = 104 assets as a function of the average banks’ degree µb. Results refer
to 1000 runs in which a random asset is initially devalued by 35%. We observe phase
transitions at two critical values µ1, µ2 of µb, with a contagion window in between where
global cascades of failures occur with non-zero probability. Above and below this window,
where µb > µ2 or µb < µ1, global cascades do not occur.
The existence of a contagion window, and the nonmonotonicity of the contagion prob-
ability as a function of µb, can be understood with the following arguments. On one hand,
for sufficiently low values of µb, stress cannot propagate through the system because the
network is poorly connected; there is not enough overlap between the banks’ portfolios to
spread the cascade. In particular, for small enough µb the network of banks and assets
consists of small components disconnected from one another, so even if every bank is ex-
tremely vulnerable to collapse, an initial shock will only affect one of these components.
Thus there is a critical µ1 below which the cascade cannot propagate; the initial shock
might affect a few nearby banks, but the cascade quickly dies out.
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Figure 2: Left panel: contagion probability (blue dots, the solid line is a guide for the eye) and conditional
extent of contagion (red squares) measured from 1000 simulations of a system with N = M = 104. In each
run, the initial shock consists of dropping the price of a random asset by 35% at the beginning of the
simulation. We vary the average degree of diversification µb = µa. The two vertical dashed lines mark our
numerical estimates for the critical values µ1 and µ2 where phase transitions occur, and show the existence
of a contagion window between these transitions where global cascades occur with non-zero probability.
The system also displays a “robust yet fragile” behavior for µb slightly below µ2: the probability of a global
cascade is small, but when one occurs it affects almost all the banks. Right panel: contagion probability
for systems with N = 104 and M = 5 × 103 (red squares), M = 104 (green diamonds) and M = 2 × 104
(black stars) as a function of the average banks’ degree. Solid lines are a guide for the eye. The boundaries
µ1, µ2 of the contagion window depend on the value of the crowding parameter n = N/M : for larger n both
phase transitions are shifted to the left.
On the other hand, if the banks’ portfolios are sufficiently diverse, they are robust with
respect to devaluing any single asset in their portfolio. Moreover, a larger average bank
degree µb also implies a larger average asset degree µa, so each institution typically holds
a smaller fraction of the shares of any given asset. As a consequence, each bank failure
has a relatively small effect on asset prices, and most banks remain solvent even if some of
their assets are devalued. Thus there is a critical µ2 above which cascades quickly die out
even though the network is highly connected.
The left panel of Figure 2 also shows that the system displays a “robust yet fragile”
behavior [1] for some values of the parameters. Specifically, if µb is slightly less than µ2,
just inside the upper end of the contagion window, the probability of a global cascade is
very small, tending continuously to zero as µb approaches µ2 from below. But when a
global cascade does occur, it affects almost all the banks: the conditional extent of the
contagion is almost 1.
In the right panel of Figure 2 we plot the contagion probability for different values of
the crowding parameter n = N/M . As n increases, the contagion window shifts to the left,
decreasing both µ1 and µ2.
The shift in µ1 can be understood in terms of the appearance of a giant connected
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component in the network. In the ensemble of random networks considered here, the
emergence of the giant component corresponds to the situation where the average number of
banks to which a given bank b is exposed, i.e. the average number of banks whose portfolios
share at least one asset with b, is one. Equivalently, this is the average degree of the
projected network where two banks are connected if they share an asset. For this ensemble
(essentially the bipartite version of the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model) this degree is µaµb = µ
2
bn,
giving µ1 = 1/
√
n.
To explain the shift in the second transition point µ2, we note that the drop in price
of an asset caused by the liquidation of a portfolio is a decreasing function of n. This is
because the average number of banks investing in a given asset is µa = µbn. If each bank
owns a smaller fraction of an asset, the market impact of a fire sale on that asset is smaller.
When n is larger, this effect takes over at a smaller value of µb.
Note that, as a result, changing the crowding parameter n has different effects on the
network’s stability depending on the value of µb. If µb is close to µ1, increasing n while
keeping µb fixed increases the instability of the system, moving it into the contagion window
by increasing the connectivity of the network. The opposite is true if µb is close to µ2,
where increasing n moves us outside the contagion window by making assets and banks
more robust. Thus the contagion probability is not a monotonic function of n.
4.2 Dependence on shocks
The above simulations started with an initial shock consisting of devaluing a random asset.
We now consider the case where we begin with the failure of a random bank. Figure 3
shows a comparison between simulations with shocks of these two types. We observe that
the probability of contagion depends on the type of shock, but the contagion window and
the conditional extent of contagion are the same for both types of shock. The reason is
simple: while the initial conditions of these two processes are different, their dynamics are
the same. Once a cascade has begun, it doesn’t matter what kind of shock began it. Thus
the region where the dynamics cause a cascade to spread rather than die out is the same
in both cases, as is the eventual size of a global cascade if one occurs.
4.3 Leverage
We now show what happens for different values of initial leverage. In the left panel of
Figure 4 we plot the contagion probability for different values of µb as a function of λ. We
observe that, for each µb, there is a critical value of λ above which global cascades occur
with non-zero probability, and below which they do not. This is of interest for regulatory
purposes, since it implies the existence of a critical level of leverage below which systemic
stability is guaranteed. In addition, the critical value of λ increases as µb increases: in other
words, increasing diversification allows for a greater degree of leverage without creating
systemic events.
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Figure 3: The probability of contagion, and the average conditional extent of contagion, as a function
of µb for the two types of initial shock (failed asset vs. failed bank). Red squares: contagion probability
where a random asset is devalued by 35%. Blue dots: the contagion probability when a random bank
fails. Blue circles and green triangles: conditional extent of contagion for asset shocks and bank shocks
respectively. We see that while the probability of contagion differs between the two types of shocks, the
window µ1 < µb < µ2 in which they occur with non-zero probability is the same. Moreover, when a global
cascade does occur, its average size is the same for both types of shocks. Results refer to 1000 simulations
of systems with N = M = 104.
In the right panel of Figure 4, we show that a similar behavior occurs as we change the
parameter α that appears in the market impact function while keeping the leverage fixed.
That is, for a given value of µb and λ, there is a critical value of α above which contagion
occurs. This is not unexpected, since under the assumptions specified in Section 3.3 the
solvency condition for bank i can be written as
λi ≤
∑M
j=1Qije
−αxtj
E0i
+ 1, (20)
where xtj is the fraction of shares of asset j liquidated up to time t. When α is larger,
the market impact of a fire sale is greater, causing a sharper drop in asset prices. On
the other hand, increasing diversification µb increases this critical value of α, showing that
diversification allows banks to survive a larger price impact.
Summarizing, we presented in this section results of numerical simulations for bipartite
networks with Poisson degree distributions for both banks and assets. The probability
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Figure 4: Left panel: Contagion probability as a function of leverage measured from 1000 simulations
of a system with N = 10000 for different values of µb.The initial shock considered is the initial failure of a
random bank. Contagion probability is a monotonic function of leverage, and a phase transition separates a
regime where no global cascades are observed from one where they occur with non-zero probability. Right
panel: Contagion probability as a function of the market impact parameter α. Increasing market impact
has a similar effect as increasing leverage.
and the average extent of contagion have been measured for two different types of shocks,
namely the initial depreciation of a random asset or the initial failure of a random bank.
Our simulations suggest that:
• As a function of the average diversification of banks’ portfolios, represented by their
average degree µb, the system is characterized by two phase transitions that define a
contagion window where global cascades occurs with non-zero probability.
• Changing the crowding parameter n, i.e. the ratio of the number of banks to the
number of assets available for investment, can increase or decrease the contagion
probability depending on which of these transitions we are close to.
• Although the contagion probability is different for the two types of initial shocks,
the contagion window within which global cascades occur, and the average extent of
these cascades when they occur, are the same.
• The system displays a “robust yet fragile” behavior, with regions in parameter space
where global cascades are very unlikely, but where almost the entire system is affected
if one occurs.
• For each fixed µb and n, there is a critical value of the leverage λ above which the
system becomes unstable. This critical value of λ increases with µb.
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5 Comparison to predictions from stability analysis
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Figure 5: Contagion probability (green dots, right axis) as computed from numerical simulations of a
system of size N = M = 104. The red solid line (left axis) represent the largest eigenvalue ξ1 of the matrix
N . The dashed horizontal line is in correspondence to ξ1 = 1. If ξ1 > 1 global cascades are observed in
numerical simulations. The theory underestimates the width of the contagion window, as it only gives a
sufficient condition for global cascades to occur. However, the discrepancy between theory and numerical
results is partly due to finite size effects (see Figure 6).
We now compare the numerical results presented in the previous section to those based
on stability analysis. The stability analysis depends on two assumptions that are not
necessarily well-satisfied in the simulation. The first is that M and N are both infinite
(even though their ratio n = N/M is finite), and the second is that the failure process can
be described through a branching process on a tree.
We estimated F (h, k, `) through monte-carlo methods and assumed that the contribu-
tion coming from banks with degree higher than 200 is negligible. We then numerically
diagonalized the 200 by 200 matrix N . We discuss in the following the results obtained in
the case where Pa(`) and Pb(h) are Poisson distributions.
In Figure 5 we plot for n = 1 the largest eigenvalue of N and we compare it with the
contagion probability as computed from numerical simulations. As expected, when the
largest eigenvalue of N is greater than 1 global cascades are observed. We see from the
figure that the analytic calculation underestimates the size of the contagion window. This
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Figure 6: Simulation results for N = 100 ( blue circles), N = 1000 (red squares), N = 20000 (green
triangles), n = 1. The vertical dashed lines are drawn in correspondence to the phase transitions predicted
by the analytic calculation. As the size of the system increases the agreement between theory and simulations
improves. Finite size effects are expected given that the theory is valid in the limit {N,M} → ∞.
is partly due to finite size effects, as observed for instance in [25]. We plot in Figure 6
the contagion probability as measured from numerical simulations for n = 1 and different
values of N . From the figure we clearly see that by increasing the size of the system the
discrepancy between analytic and numerical calculations gets smaller, and that the analytic
solution, although giving only a sufficient condition for global cascades to occur, produces
a reasonable estimate of the contagion window when N and M are large.
We finally plot in Figure 7 the phase diagram obtained with our analytic approach.
The region within the solid line in the left panel represent the region where global cascades
occur for λ = 20. From the figure we can see the features already observed in numerical
simulations. In particular, for fixed n, we clearly see the existence of two phase transitions
that define a window of connectivities where global cascades occur with non-zero proba-
bility. As we change n, the analytic calculation also predicts the shift in the transition
points, that tend to move to higher values of µb as n is decreased. In the right panel of
Figure 7, we depict the phase diagram for n = 1 as a function of leverage λ and average
diversification µb. As expected, we see that the contagion window widens as λ increases.
A three dimensional visualization of the phase diagram is reported in Figure 8, where the
red region denotes the unstable region of parameter space. Interestingly, we observe the
existence of a minimum level of leverage (λ ' 12) that leads to the occurrence of global
cascades of failure. This feature is of potential interest for regulators, since it is equivalent
to the existence of a maximum level of leverage below which the system is overall stable.
Another point of potential interest for regulators is the eigenvalue of the matrix N . In
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Figure 7: Left panel: The red region is the region of phase space where global cascades occur for a
system with λ = 20 as a function of µb and n. Right panel: the red region is the region of phase space
where global cascades occur for a system with n = 1 as a function of µb and λ. Points refer to the phase
transition as measured from the largest eigenvalue of N . Lines are a guide for the eye.
a dynamic setting in which banks operate under no stress circumstances, one expects ξ1
to change over time as banks trade to rebalance their portfolios. By monitoring the time
behavior of ξ1, a regulator would notice if the system is approaching a dangerous regime
as ξ1 gets closer to 1, and could act to increase the stability of the system.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a framework for thinking about the stability properties of banking
networks due to overlapping portfolios. This framework emphasizes that the key property
is stability: If the system is stable, shocks will not propagate; if it is unstable, a shock
can be amplified and trigger cascading bankruptcies. This can be discussed in terms of a
branching process that gives insight into the dynamics of failure. While we have called these
“banking networks” for simplicity, the basic ideas are relevant for any leveraged financial
institutions.
To understand how the stability of banking networks might depend on parameters such
as diversification, leverage and crowding, we formulated a stylized model of a financial
system in which N banks with average diversification µb invest in a common pool of M
assets. The system can be conveniently described in terms of a bipartite network, with
banks being connected through links to the assets in their portfolios. Links have a two-
fold role in such a network. On one hand, they allow individual banks to diversify their
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Figure 8: 3D visualization of the region of parameter space where global cascades occur with non-zero
probability as predicted with the analytical approach. Global cascades are observed within the cone-shaped
colored region. We note in particular that there is critical value of leverage below which global cascades do
not occur for any values of diversification and crowding parameter.
investment and reduce their exposure to a specific asset. On the other hand, they are
channels for the propagation of financial contagion. We characterized the response of such
system to initial shocks affecting a single asset or bank.
The relevant parameters for the model are the average diversification µb, the crowding
parameter n = N/M (that measures the proportion of banks to assets), and the initial
leverage λ. By means of numerical simulations we showed the existence of phase transitions
separating a region in parameter space where global cascades occur from a region where
global cascades never occur. In particular, the double role played by links in the bipartite
network representing the system is reflected in a nonmonotonic behavior of the contagion
probability as a function of µb, where we observe the existence of two phase transitions at
µb = µ1 and µb = µ2 that define a window of connectivities such that global cascades occur
if µ1 ≤ µb ≤ µ2. Changing the crowding parameter n has the effect of shifting the location
of the phase transitions. Finally, our model shows that increasing leverage increases the
overall instability of the system, but that there is a critical level of leverage below which
global cascades do not occur for any value of diversification or crowding.
Using an analytical approach based on generalized branching processes on networks,
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we are able to analytically estimate the region of parameter space where global cascades
occur. This branching process is different from standard ones in the fact that the fate of
a node depends on its degree and on the degree of all its neighbors. This greatly increases
the difficulty of the problem. We are nonetheless able to solve it by generalizing existing
methods. Thus, apart from their specific application to financial contagion, our methods
can be applied to a wide variety of contagion models, where susceptibility and transmission
probabilities depend on node degrees.
The mechanistic model considered in this paper can be extended in several directions.
First of all, it would be interesting to relax some of the specific assumptions considered
in this paper (homogeneity of banks’ balance sheets, Poisson degree distributions, market
impact function) in order to understand how different choices for the network topology or
the statistical properties of balance sheets impact the stability of the system. Although
we do not expect different results from a qualitative point of view, it should nonetheless
be possible to asses the relative stability of systems with different properties, similarly to
what has been done for counterparty loss in [9]. In particular, it would be very useful to
empirically characterize real systems and calibrate the model with real data. This could
potentially make it possible to test the effectiveness of new policies aimed at reducing
systemic risk.
A further direction we plan to pursue in the future is to go beyond the mechanistic
model by considering a more realistic price dynamics and allowing banks to react to price
fluctuations by rebalancing their portfolios. This should allow the system to develop en-
dogenous crisis similar to the ones observed in [26], and to generate the systemic instabilities
induced by leverage and mark-to-market accounting practices discussed in [10].
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